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 Abstract 
 Recent developments in training and assessment have focused on training of non-
technical skills. The maritime industry has made significant investments in training and 
assessment in safety. Previous literature has discussed whether training an assessment pays 
off in terms of improved safety at the sharp end. However, they have not provided ample 
evidence on the effectiveness of CRM training on safety. The report also gives an overview of 
maritime transport. The emphasis here is maritime transport’s safety performance compared 
to other transport modes. Resource Management and Simulation-Based Training have been 
introduced in the maritime industry. The aim of the thesis is to document the effectiveness of 
training and assessment. The method will be a literature review on the effectiveness of team 
training.  
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 The purpose of the thesis is to find out whether training and assessment in the 
maritime industry affect safety performance at the sharp end. The method will be a 
literature review on the effectiveness of team training. Billions of dollars are spent on 
training and assessment annually (Salas, Tannenbaum, Kraiger, & Smith-Jentsch, 
2012). Most research on team training evaluation have been conducted in the military 
and in aviation (Salas et al., 2008). 
Safety at sea depends to a high degree on the interaction between bridge 
personnel, the deck department, and the engine department. Learning how to work in 
a team, and to perform functions in a timely and safely fashion is of utmost 
importance in the daily operation of a vessel. The master has the main responsibility 
for the safety of personnel and passengers on board.  
Training and assessment of seafarers has traditionally focused on the training 
of technical and practical skills, such as navigation, manoeuvring, mooring, and 
maintenance (Øvergård et al., In Press). Only recently have maritime organisations 
laid an emphasis on training and assessment of non-technical skills. Most training and 
assessment courses in the maritime industry aim at training technical skills. The aim 
of training and assessment is to ensure that maritime personnel receive adequate 
training so that they can perform maritime operations in compliance with STCW, 
ISM, and ISPS codes. 
In the maritime industry, on the job (OTB) training was the norm in the 19th 
and 20th century when young cadets received all their training and assessment on 
board in the British Navy. However, this changed when formal requirements were 
introduced in the 20th century following major maritime accidents such as the Titanic, 
compulsory schooling, and especially technological innovations revolutionized the 
maritime sector (container shipping, ECDIS and AIS, etc.). There was first a 
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transition from on the job training to the classroom. Innovations such as the Personal 
Computer and a tremendous increase in computational power, has transformed the 
training and assessment of operators. The development of advanced simulation 
technologies such as Virtual Reality (VR) changed the nature of training and 
assessment of seafarers.  
The Manila Amendments to the STCW Code contains new requirements 
relating to training in modern technology such as ECDIS as well as new requirements 
for marine environment awareness and training in leadership and teamwork (IMO, 
2011). 
Recent developments in training and assessment have focused on the training 
of non-technical skills, as opposed to technical skills (Flin, O'Connor, & Crichton, 
2008; Flin, Patey, Glavin, & Maran, 2010). Research has shown that improving 
individual team members’ nontechnical skills may have an impact on team 
performance and overall safety (Flin & Patey, 2009).  
Research on how pilots interact with machines in the cockpit has resulted in the 
development of Crew Resource Management. Crew Resource Management is a training 
method that aims at developing the operator’s non-technical skills. The use of CRM for 
training team (non-technical) skills such as situational awareness, decision-making and 
communication has been used in high-reliability industries such as aviation and nuclear 
power plants. A high reliability organisation develops high reliability systems that can 
operate relatively error-free over a long period of time, and sometimes, in very 
hazardous environments (Bea, 1998, p. 110). 
Previous research on training effectiveness on maritime safety include Fonne, 
Fredriksen, and Jensen (1995) and  O'Connor (2011). There is a paucity of research 
on the effectiveness of training on safety in the maritime industry. However, there are 
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many studies on the effectiveness of CRM training in aviation and health care. Salas 
et al. (2012) mentions that “the research on training clearly shows two things: (a) 
training works, and b) the way training is designed, delivered, and implemented, 
matters”. 
Salas, Burke, Bowers, and Wilson (2001) conducted a comprehensive review 
of 58 articles on CRM training for flight crews within the commercial and military 
domains. The results of the study show that CRM training produced a) positive 
reactions (i.e. affective and utility based), b) enhanced learning, and c) desired 
behavior change in the cockpit. However, it was not possible to determine the impact 
of CRM training on safety (Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, & Howse, 2006). Salas, 
Burke, et al. (2001) found that CRM training led to positive attitudes, learning, and 
(potentially) safety in organisations. Three of the five studies that evaluated training at 
the organisational level suggested that CRM training had a positive impact on safety 
in terms of reduced human error or incidents (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman, 
2006, p. 404). A subsequent study, Salas, Wilson, Burke, and Wightman (2006), 
mentioned that CRM training produces positive reactions, enhanced learning, and 
desired behavioral change in a simulated or real environment. However, the study was 
inconclusive with respect to the effect of CRM on safety.  
Previous literature on human reliability in transport systems include Dhillon 
(2009).  
 The main research question in this thesis will be: 
1. How do training and assessment programmes affect maritime safety? 
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Outline of thesis 
The first chapter will be about human reliability. I will also explain the 
concept of human error and safety. The second chapter will present safety 
performance in the maritime industry and other transport modes, and will include a 
table on the reliability of transport systems. The third chapter will give an overview of 
maritime regulations, e.g. STCW 2010. The fourth chapter, theory of training, will 
give an overview of theories on training and assessment. The fifth chapter, method, 
will provide an overview of the concepts that have been used in the literature review, 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria, and training and assessment procedures. The 
emphasis has been on the transfer of training. The sixth chapter includes the 
findings.The seventh chapter, analysis, will discuss the degree to which CRM training 
affects safety performance at the sharp end.  
    Human Reliability 
Definition of Safety 
There is no commonly agreed definition of safety. The American Standards 
Institute defined safety as freedom from unacceptable risk, where unacceptable risk is 
indirectly defined as a risk for which the probability is too high (Hollnagel, 2014). 
Safety is a construct that may prove difficult to assess and interpret, as there are 
different perceptions of safety among maritime stakeholders. Safety assessment and 
measurement of maritime accidents can be difficult as the maritime industry consists 
of many different kinds of ships in complex environments (Lu & Tseng, 2012). As 
safety is a property of a system, it is not directly observable before one has a lack of 
safety.  Many claim that they can document what affects safety performance, but the 
problem here is that there are no data to confirm it. We know about accidents, but 
little about their causes. Perrow (1999) postulated that accidents are the norm in high-
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risk industries. Errors and accidents cannot be eliminated entirely; only the time 
interval between accidents. 
 Hollnagel (2014, pp. 39-40) distinguishes between the ‘sharp end’ and 
the ‘blunt end’. The sharp end refers to the proximal factors (here and now) as 
opposed to the blunt end, which are the distal factors (working there and then) 
(Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, & Baldauf, 2012). The sharp end can also refer to the 
physical factors (i.e. navigating a vessel), whilst the blunt refers to the underlying 
factors (such as organisational and managerial). Although the blunt end 
(organisational and technical factors) may have an impact on safety performance, 
operational safety depends on the actions (psychological and physiological) that occur 
at the sharp end, when the operator is performing the task, e.g. navigation. Common 
features in the sharp end include uncertain and dynamic environments, multiple 
sources of concurrent information, an environment that is subject to stress and fatigue, 
introduction of new technologies with many redundancies, and differing goals and 
intentions among team members (Reason, 1995). Safety performance can be 
measured by errors or accidents, and is an important outcome of team performance 
(Flin et al., 2008).  
Human Error  
Human error is now widely recognised as the main cause of maritime 
accidents (Rothblum, 2007). Roughly 80 per cent of accidents in the maritime 
industry can be attributed to human error (Fenucci, 1990).  Reason (2013, p. 10) 
defines human error as being:  “… all those occasions in which a planned sequence of 
mental or physical activities fails to achieve its desired goal without the intervention 
of some chance agency”. 
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There is now an increasing recognition in the human factors literature that part 
of the responsibility for human error lies with designers and operators and not just the 
end users of the socio-technical system (Johnson, 2011). According to Rasmussen 
(1997) society seeks to control safety behaviour through the socio-technical system. 
The socio-technical system includes many levels of decision-makers involved in the 
control of safety by means of laws and regulations, whose aim is to educate, guide, or 
constrain the work force’s behaviour by rules and equipment design to improve their 
safety performance (Rasmussen, 1997).  
   Safety Performance 
Maritime Transport 
  IHS Maritime world casualty statistics for 2013 (IHS Maritime, 2014) show 
that 138 ships with a total of 863 314 GT were reported as total losses. While the age 
of the world fleet increased from 12.5 years in 1980 to 22 years old in 2005, ship loss 
rates have fallen with 73% over the same period (Alderton, 2011). During the same 
period, the world fleet increased from 73,500 to 92,225. 
In European waters there have been no significant accidents in the 
Passenger/Ro-Ro ship category since the foundering of the Estonia on 28 September 
1994. In 2014 the highest number of casualties occurred in the maritime region South 
China, Indo China, Indonesia & the Philippines (AGCS, 2015). According to an 
analysis of time lost through injuries reported to the Maritime Authority in 2001, the 
rate of injury for vessels in the Danish Maritime Shipping Register was estimated to 
be 14.2 injuries per million working hours (Jensen et al., 2004).  
The term that is used to assess maritime safety is total loss. The total loss of 
ships means “propelled merchant ships of not less than 100 GT which, as a result of 
being a marine casualty, have ceased to exist, either by the virtue of the fact the ships 
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are irrecoverable, or have been subsequently broken up” (AGCS, 2012). The number 
of world fleets will influence the amount or occurrence of maritime accidents, which 
is measured by the total loss number (Li & Zheng, 2008). The total loss rate can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡
 
 
Figure 1 gives the total loss rate of ships between 1970 and 2003 (Li & Zheng, 2008). 
 
Figure 1 Total Loss Rate 1973-2003 
Source: Li and Zheng (2008) 
 
One third of maritime accidents happen in two maritime regions of the world, 
South China, Indo China, Indonesia & Philippines, and Japan, Korea and North China 
(AGCS, 2015). The number of total losses for ships over 500 GT was only 75 in 
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2014, which represents a 50 per cent decrease since 2005 (IUMI, 2014). Table 1 
shows the number of total losses by ship type.  
 
Table 1 Total losses by ship type (2005-2014) 
 
Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence Casualty Statistics  
 
 Hassel, Asbjørnslett, and Hole (2011) compared casualty data from IHS 
Fairplay from the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2009. The findings 
document that the estimated upper limit reporting performance for the flag states 
ranged from 14% to 74%, whilst the corresponding estimated average for IHS 
Fairplay ranged from 4% to 62%. The study shows that on average 50% of accidents 
are unreported in the maritime industry (Hassel et al., 2011). 
In the following section, I will give an overview of the safety performance in  
aviation, rail, and road transport.  
Aviation, Rail, and Road Transport 
Aviation 
Statistics suggest that only 1 out of 22.8 million flights will encounter a fatal 
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accident (Courtright, Stewart, & Ward, 2012). ICAO identified three high-risk 
categories based on a historical analysis of accident data. The high-risk occurrence 
categories are (ICAO, 2014):  
 
 Run-way safety related events 
 Loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) 
 Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 
 
An aircraft accident can be defined as “an occurrence associated with the 
operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any person boards the plane 
with the intention of flight and such time as all such persons have disembarked, in 
which (Boeing, 2014):  
 
 The aircraft sustains substantial damage 
 The aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible 
 Death or serious injury results from 
o Being in the aircraft 
o Direct contact with the aircraft or anything attached thereto 
o Direct exposure to jet blast 
 
Mortality Risk for Passenger flights is a measure that ignores the length and 
duration of flight, which are unrelated to risk, and weights each accident by the 
proportion of passengers killed (Barnett & Wang, 2000). One accident that kills every 
passenger on board is counted as one accident, whereas one accident that only kills a 
quarter of the passengers is counted as a quarter of a fatal accident (CAA, 2013, p. 
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33).  
Table 2 shows the mortality risk for passenger flights expressed in three ways: 
1) a pure probability, 2) the number of randomly chosen passenger flights that it 
would take, on average, to kill an aircraft occupant, and 3) the number of years that 
would pass if such as flight was taken every day (CAA, 2013, pp. 33-34). 
 
Table 2 Mortality Risk for passenger flights for the ten-year period 2002 to 2011 
broken down by aircraft class and operator region 
 Per Flight 
Number of 
Flights 
Number of 
Years 
All Passenger Flights 3.2 x 10-7 3.1 million 8,505 
Jet Passenger Flights 20 x 10-7 5.0 million 13,573 
Turboprop Passenger Flights 7.9 x 10-7 1.3 million 3,466 
African Operator Passenger Flights 2.0 x 10-6 0.5 million 1,390 
Asian and Middle Eastern Operator 
Passenger Flights 
4.0 x 10-7 2.5 million 6,784 
Caribbean, Central and South 
American Operator Passenger Flights 
8.1 x 10-7 1.2 million 3,385 
European Operator Passenger Flights 
 
2.7 x 10-7 3.8 million 10,285 
(EU) 5.8 x 10-8 17.2 million 47,215 
North American Operator Passenger 
Flights 
5.3 x 10-8 19.0 million 51,982 
Oceania Operator Passenger Flights 1.9 x 10-7 5.3 million 14,655 
 
Source: Adapted from CAA (2013, p. 34) 
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Rail 
There are around 2400 significant accidents on the railways of EU member 
states annually.  In 2013 two types of accidents, rolling stock in motion and level-
crossing accidents, represented 83,5 % of the total amount of victims and 90,6 % of 
the fatalities. More than three quarters of railway accidents are caused by rolling stock 
in motion and level crossing accidents. 2 219 persons were killed or seriously injured 
in railway accidents in the EU-28 in 2013. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between significant accidents and resulting 
casualties for the EU-27 (2007-2011).  
 
 
Figure 2 Significant accidents and resulting casualties for the EU-27 (2007-2011) 
Source of data: EU transport in figures (Statistical Pocketbook 2012), DG MOVE 
2012, European Commission 
Road 
There has been a substantial decrease in the fatality rates of the best 
performing countries in the period 1970-2005 (Hakkert & Gitelman, 2014). Until the 
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1960s and 1970s, decision-makers followed a mono-causal approach to road safety. 
However, some researchers started to realise that this approach was not helpful, and 
opted for a systems-approach to safety. One of the first thinkers was William Haddon, 
who developed a matrix concept, describing a short sequence of events before, during, 
and after the crash, wherein countermeasures can be sought applying to the human, 
vehicle, and road elements applying to such a crash (Hakkert & Gitelman, 2014, p. 
142). Haddon sought an improvement in road safety analogous to industrial processes, 
whereby floors can be made more skid-resistant so that workers do not slip (instead of 
explaining to them to tread carefully), or making machines more fail-safe by 
introducing safety systems, for example operations by two hands before a press, or 
cutting knife, is activated (Hakkert & Gitelman, 2014). This was the underlying 
philosophy of vehicle safety regulations that improved safety performance in cars. 
However, this approach has its limitations, as it has not found ways to safety 
“package” vulnerable road-users such as motorcyclists, cyclists, and pedestrians 
(Hakkert & Gitelman, 2014). Figure 3 shows the development over time in the EU-28 
since 2010. 
 
 
Figure 3 Road Fatalities in the EU-28 2001-2010 
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Source: European Commission (2015)  
 
The overall trend shows a decrease in the number of road fatalities in the EU-
28. However, the decrease rate has slowed down in 2014. The EU road fatality rate in 
2014 was 51 deaths per million inhabitants (European Commission, 2015).  
Globally the number of people killed on the world’s roads was 1.24 million in 
2010 (WHO, 2013). Eighty per cent of road traffic deaths occur in middle-income 
countries, which represent 72% of the world’s registered vehicles. The overall global 
road traffic fatality rate is now 18 per 100 000 population (WHO, 2013). Pedestrians 
and cyclists account for twenty-seven per cent of all road traffic deaths (WHO, 2013). 
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Table 3 Reliability of Transport Systems 
Source Eurostat 
(2014) 
Eurostat 
(2014) 
Eurostat 
(2014) 
European 
Commission 
(2014) 
CAA (2013) CAA (2013) CAA (2013) IHS Maritime 
(2014) 
IHS 
Maritime 
(2014) 
IHS Maritime 
(2014) 
Metrics Rail 
 
Number of 
fatalities 
EU-28 
Rail 
 
Number of 
fatalities 
EU-15 
Rail 
 
Fatality rate 
per billion 
pkm 
Road 
 
Fatality rate 
per mill. 
inhabitants 
EU-28 
Aviation 
 
Per Flighta 
Aviation 
 
Fatal 
Accident Rate 
(per million 
flights flown) 
Aviation 
 
Fatality Rate 
(per million 
flights flown) 
Maritime 
 
Total Lossesb 
Maritime 
 
Loss Rate 
m.GT 
Maritime 
 
Fatalitiesc 
2008 1509 634      187 0,55 1 118 
2009 1478 623      228 1,23 693 
2010 1314 580  62    218 1,10 253 
2011 1265 529      176 1,17 3214 
2012 1174 523  55    158 0,84 641 
2013 1184 601 0.24 52 3.2 x 10-7 0.6 22.0 138 0,86 290 
2014    51       
Average 1320 581      184  1034 
 
aMortality Risk for passenger flights 
 breported total losses of propelled, sea-going merchant ships of 100GT and above 
cThe number of persons reported killed or missing (lives lost) as a result of total losses  
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Maritime Regulations 
The International Maritime Organisation 
The International Maritime Organisation was established in 1959 as a 
permanent international body to promote maritime safety more effectively (Grech, 
Horberry, & Koester, 2008). Today the most important conventions are the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) 
and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended in 1974 
(SOLAS 74). International maritime conventions are often adopted as a response to 
major maritime accidents. This has been the case since the first iteration of SOLAS in 
1914, two years after the loss of the Titanic in the Northern Atlantic.  
IMO regulations are mandatory, but it is up to the flag state to implement and 
interpret them. IMO is rather slow at introducing new regulations that may impact 
safety performance, mainly because amendments to existing conventions need the 
ratification of 2/3rds of its 171 member states. However, the track record of the 
maritime industry with regard to safety has been rather lacklustre compared to other 
transport modes such as aviation and rail.  
Safety Management System (ISM Code) 
The ISM code was added as Chapter IX in SOLAS in 1994 and became 
mandatory for passenger and dangerous cargo ships in 1998, and for the reset of the 
fleet in 2002 (Chauvin et al., 2013). According to the International Safety 
Management  (ISM) Code, ship owners must satisfy formal requirements that 
ascertain that the shipping company establishes and maintains procedures to control 
documents and data relevant to the safety management system (documents of 
compliance) (Lu & Tseng, 2012).  
According to the ISM code, every company must develop maintain, and 
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implement a Safety Management System (SMS). The company must also assess and 
document the position of responsibility and individual competency of each crew 
member (IUMI, 2014). The SMS includes the following functional requirements 
(Chauvin, Lardjane, Morel, Clostermann, & Langard, 2013): 
(a) A safety and environmental protection policy 
(b) Instructions and procedures to ensure the safe operation of  
Ships and protection of the environment in compliance with  
relevant international and flag State legislation 
(c) Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between,  
and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel 
(d) Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations 
(e) Procedures for international audits and management reviews 
STCW 
STCW (International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978/1995/2010 established uniform standards of 
competence for seafarers. Maritime education and training now requires certificates of 
proficiency such as STCW 95. The maritime industry has taken several measures to 
improve its safety performance. However, the majority of the world’s seafarers work 
on a ship that has a different flag state than their country of origin. This signifies that 
confidence in standards of competence is underpinned by the IMO Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) (ICS, 
2014). 
Major Maritime Accidents that led to Maritime Safety Legislation 
Maritime safety regulations can be traced back to the Titanic (Alderton, 2011) 
Major maritime accidents in European waters include the Torrey Canyon and 
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the Amoco Cadiz. The Torrey Canyon ran aground on Pollard's Rock between Land's 
End and the Isles of Scilly on 18 March 1967. 119,328 tonnes of crude oil seeped into 
the Atlantic. The crude oil from the oil spill had devastating environmental 
consequences, and is still killing wildlife on a daily basis (Barkham, 2010). IMO and 
its member states ratified the MARPOL Act in 1973 as a response to the incident. It 
was later amended in 1978 following the Amoco Cadiz disaster. The Amoco Cadiz 
crashed into the Portsall rocks off the coast of Brittany on 16 March 1978. However, 
the MARPOL Convention did not enter into force before October 2, 1983.  
Following the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, MARPOL Annex I was amended 
in 1992. MARPOL Annex I required the phasing out of single-hull tankers. All category 
I tankers were to be phased out within 2015, whilst Category II and III tankers were to 
be phased out within 2015 (Håvold, 2010, p. 511). 
After major accidents involving oil spills such as the Torrey Canyon in 1967 
and the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, IMO member states ratified the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973) as modified 
by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). 
As a consequence of the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, Congress passed the 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA 1990). OPA 1990 also included provisions with respect to 
safety at sea that are now mandatory for maritime organisations. 
The Costa Concordia incident is a reminder that safety at sea requires 
continuous attention, and that even modern ships equipped with state-of-the-art 
technologies are vulnerable to human error.  
The Costa Concordia incident, as many major accidents before it, prompted 
changes in maritime regulations on training that may impact safety performance. 
Recommendations from the accident investigation of the Costa Concordia included 
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provisions for revising the contents of instruments such as SOLAS, STCW and the 
ISM Code with regard to issues such as (Marine Casualties Investigative Body, 2013): 
a) Bridge Resource Management (a more flexible use of the resources and an 
emphasis on decision-making and “thinking aloud”) 
b) Bridge Team Management courses should be mandatory by 1. January 
2015 
c) Principles of Minimum Safety Manning should be updated to be more 
suitable for larger passenger ships 
d) A muster list that documents that crew members have the proper 
certifications 
e) The inclusion of inclinometer measurements in the VDR.  
Theory of Training 
Training has been defined as “the systematic acquisition of attitudes, concepts, 
knowledge, rules, or skills that should result in improved performance (Goldstein, 
1991)”. 
CRM Training  
Crew Resource Management was first introduced in 1979 as a training method 
aiming to improve non-technical skills among pilots in the cockpit. The training method 
was first named Cockpit Resource Management, but was extended to include cabin and 
maintenance personnel and renamed Crew Resource Management. The focus of most 
CRM training at this stage was on input factors, especially in the area of knowledge 
and attitudes (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). J.K Lauber, a psychologist member of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) defined CRM as “using all available 
resources – information, equipment and people – to achieve safe and efficient flight 
operations (Lauber, 1984, p. 20)”. 
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CRM training aims at developing the operator’s non-technical skills, such as s, 
communication, decision-making, leadership, management of stress & fatigue, 
Situational Awareness, and team-based coordination and cooperation. Non-technical 
skills has been defined as “the cognitive, social and personal resource skills that 
complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance (Flin 
et al., 2008, p. 1)”. Non-technical skills are the decision-making and social skills that 
complement technical skills. Team decision-making refers to a process in which team 
members reach a common decision based on interdependent individuals to reach a 
common goal (Flin et al., 2008, p. 110). Disadvantages when developing a schema to 
assess non-technical skills can be that accident analysis may present only part of the 
complete picture (Hollnagel, 2004). 
Cognitive skills can be defined as “the mental processes used for gaining and 
maintaining situational awareness, for solving problems, and for taking decisions 
(Royal Aeronautical Society, 1999)”. Situational Awareness can be defined by goals 
and tasks specified for a job. Level 1, perception of  “cues” is an important element of 
SA. Without a basic perception of important information, the trainee may not be able 
to correctly assess the situation.  
Level 2, Comprehension encompasses how people combine, store, interpret and 
retain information (Endsley, 2000). Level 3, Projection refers to the operator’s ability 
to project from current events and dynamics to anticipate future events (and their 
implications) (Endsley, 2000).  
CRM training does not necessarily strengthen any particular team, but it can 
improve the efficiency of individual team members’ in whichever team they are 
working in (Flin et al., 2008, p. 93). CRM training involves communicating basic 
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knowledge of human factors that relate to maritime operations and provide the tools 
for applying these concepts operationally (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). 
Evaluation of CRM Training 
The objective of CRM is to find out whether 1) CRM training makes any 
noticeable difference in the dependent variables and 2) the size of the training effect 
(Salas, Bowers, & Edens, 2001). Team-based coordination and cooperation and SA 
can for example influence decision-making. CRM Training can be measured using a 
standard rating scale. For example, airlines should be able to specify the criteria for 
standard performance on the basis of a job analysis (Holt, Boehm-Davis, & Beaubien, 
2001, p. 198). Both technical and CRM performance ratings can be based on a 4-point 
rating scale covering the full range of possible crew performance (Holt et al., 2001): 
unsatisfactory, satisfactory, standard, and above standard.  
 
Table 4 Four-Point Rating Scale With Labels and Their Meanings   
    
Rated Value    Label   Precise Meaning 
1 Unsatisfactory Observed crew behavior did 
not meet minimum 
requirements 
2 Satisfactory Observed crew performance 
met FAA standards but not 
airline standards 
3 Standard Observed crew performance 
met airline standards 
4 Above Standard Observed crew behavior was 
markedly better than the 
standard performance in some 
important way 
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Source: Holt et al. (2001, p. 198) 
 
Measurement of Training Effectiveness 
Sensitivity can be defined as “the extent to which a measure can detect 
changes in the construct being assessed” (Holt et al., 2001, p. 174). For example, a 
sensitive measure of resource management should show higher scores for 
performance over average and lower scores for below average performance. Extreme 
examples of good or bad performance are easier to detect. To objectively index the 
sensitivity of measurement, the judgements of the evaluators should be compared 
with pre-established levels of resource management (Holt et al., 2001).  
Reliability can be defined as the consistency or stability of measurement (Holt 
et al., 2001) . Two methods of estimating and testing reliability were found to be 
relevant, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Test-retest reliability is 
used to assess the stability of measurement over time. This form of assessment 
requires that evaluators assess the same set of performances at two different times and 
correlate these two sets of evaluations In the method mentioned above, values of r 
near 0 indicates a lack of test-retest reliability, whereas values near 1 indicate near-
perfect test-retest reliability (Holt et al., 2001).  The assessment method is carried out 
by calculating the Pearson’s product-moment correlation and results in an index r that 
reflects reliability. Values of r near 0 indicates a lack of test-retest reliability, whereas 
values near 1 indicate near-perfect test-retest reliability (Holt et al., 2001, p. 175).   .  
The other method that can be used to measure performance is internal 
consistency reliability. Internal consistency reliability refers to the internal coherence 
of a set of items that are all measuring the same thing (Nunnally, 1967). This method 
of measuring resource management requires distinct components, which each must 
have its own set of multiple items (Holt et al., 2001) . Then the inter-correlations 
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among items in a set are summarized into a coefficient alpha index, which ranges 
from 0 (no internal consistency reliability) to 1 (perfect internal consistency 
reliability) (Holt et al., 2001, p. 176).    
Validity refers to the extent of which a measure manages to measure its 
intended construct (Landy, 1986; Nunnally, 1967). From a resource management 
perspective, validity refers to the amount of variability in an evaluator’s ratings that 
accurately reflects real-life variations in performance of the persons being evaluated. 
Face validity refers to the judgement of a group of experts that the items really 
measure the construct as intended (Holt et al., 2001, p. 177). As some judgements are 
subjective, it may not be easy to confirm that an item that measures a construct has 
predictive value. Content validity requires a specification of all the items that are 
relevant to the domain. Content validity can be achieved by showing that the 
evaluation items are a fair, representative and unbiased sample from the larger domain 
(Holt et al., 2001).  
There are two basic principles that apply when examining the validity of a 
measure. Convergent and discriminant validity implies that measures that ought to be 
related to the construct should correlate or converge with the proposed measure (Holt 
et al., 2001). A construct is valid if it can show the expected relationships with 
plausible criteria (criterion validity) and predict expected outcomes of resource 
management (predictive validity). Divergent reliability implies that measures that 
ought to be distinct from resource management should diverge or not correlate with 
the proposed measure (Holt et al., 2001).  
Network validity. To examine a construct for network validity, the 
nomological network of constructs that are theoretically associated with the construct 
need to be empirically assessed to determine whether it demonstrates the expected 
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pattern of relationships (Holt et al., 2001). 
Simulation-based Training  
Salas, Wildman, and Piccolo (2009, p. 560) defined simulation-based training 
as “… any synthetic practice environment that is created in order to impart these 
competencies (i.e. attitudes, concepts, knowledge, rules, or skills) that will improve a 
trainee’s performance”. In a simulated environment the learning curve occurs at an 
accelerating pace, as students who make decisions receive immediate feedback (Salas 
et al., 2009). According to Salas et al. (2009, p. 562), “immersion refers to the sense 
of realism that a simulation elicits” . “The potential of immersion in SBT can … 
prompt relevant emotional responses during training that may be critical to the 
gaining of new competencies” (Lane, 1995).  
Simulation fidelity should be matched to simulation requirements. Research 
has shown that low-fidelity PC-based simulations can be used to train complex 
individual and teamwork skills (Salas & Burke, 2002). “Simulation in aviation, 
maritime and other environments suggests that realistic role play is essential for 
acquisition of new skills, and that recurrent practice is essential for skills 
maintenance” (Musson & Helmreich, 2004, p. 34).  
The best way to train maritime personnel in technical and non-technical skills 
is to use specially designed simulators that simulate complex shipboard conditions 
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). Full mission bridge simulators emulate the real 
shipboard environment through the use of virtual reality (VR). Simulators can also be 
used to train the trainee’s non-technical skills such as communication, decision-making 
and leadership.  
The advantages of using Simulator-Based Training are many. It is possible to 
evaluate the effectiveness of training in a controlled environment. SBT can be more 
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effective that classroom instruction. SBT is particularly adapted to the training of 
practical skills that are needed in a complex socio-technical environment such as a 
bridge.  Advanced simulators also have the possibility to introduce stressors, so that 
the trainee also receives training in handling abnormal situations, if those should 
occur. A disadvantage of using SBT is cost. A full mission simulator can cost several 
million dollars.  
Team Knowledge 
Team knowledge can be defined as the collection of task- and team-related 
knowledge held by teammates and their collective understanding of the current 
situation (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000, p. 154). 
 Edmondson (1999) conducted an examination of team learning in a field setting. 
Her findings show that team members exhibited more team-learning behaviours that 
were related to higher team performance when the team context supported 
experimentation and risk-taking (S. W. J. Kozlowski, Chao, & Jensen, 2010, p. 376). 
Her model postulated psychological safety as a key contextual construct, based on a 
perception of safety among team members, that promoted interpersonal risk taking in a 
psychologically safe setting (S. W. J. Kozlowski et al., 2010, p. 376): “Teams that 
perceived more psychological safety were engaged in more learning behaviours, such 
as sharing information, requesting assistance, seeking feedback, and discussing 
mistakes” (S. W. J. Kozlowski et al., 2010, p. 376). 
Tuckman’s classic model of team development consists of the stages forming, 
storming, norming, and performing. In the forming stage, team members experience 
uncertainty about the group, their goals and roles, and how they will work together (S. 
W. J. Kozlowski et al., 2010, p. 379). The team then enters a storming stage in which 
they formulate ideas and compete to shape a social structure to reduce uncertainty (S. 
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W. J. Kozlowski et al., 2010, p. 379). After some time, the team enters a norming stage 
when team members develop norms to guide interactions, resolve their differences, and 
reduce social uncertainty. When the social structure is in place, the different team 
members enter the performing stage, and are able to focus on the tasks that they are 
given.  
Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes (KSA)  
 J.A.  Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, and Volpe (1995)  argued that 
three competencies are required for effective teamwork: knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes (KSAs). Knowledge refers to the team members’ ability to predict and plan 
performance in future situations, along with their own roles and responsibilities (J.A.  
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). Table 5 gives a summary of teamwork competencies 
(KSAs) (Rosen et al., 2013).
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Table 5 Summary of Teamwork Competencies (KSAs) 
KSAs Description Example Behavioural Markers Example Citations 
KNOWLEDGE    
Accurate and shared mental 
models (knowledge about team 
members and role structure, team 
task, and environment) 
 
Organised knowledge structures 
of the relationships among task 
and team members 
 Team members can recognise when other 
team members need information they 
have. 
 Team members anticipate and predict the 
needs of others. 
 Team member have compatible 
explanations of task information. 
 
Blickensderfer, Cannon-Bowers, and 
Salas (1997) 
 
Cooke et al. (2000) 
 
Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, 
Milanovich, and Reynolds (2001) 
Team Mission, objective, norms, 
and resources 
An understanding of the purpose, 
vision, and available means to 
meet team goals 
 Team members make compatible task 
prioritisations. 
 Team members agree on the methods 
adopted to reach their shared goals. 
 
J.A.  Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995) 
 
Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) 
 
 
 
SKILLS 
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KSAs Description Example Behavioural Markers Example Citations 
Closed-loop communication A pattern of information 
exchange characterised by three 
steps: a sender initiates a 
message, the receiver 
acknowledges the message, and 
the sender follows up to confirm 
that it was appropriately 
interpreted 
 Team members crosscheck information 
with each other. 
 Team members give “big picture” updates 
to one another. 
 Team members proactively pass critical 
information to those that need it in a 
timely fashion. 
Bowers, Jentsch, Salas, and Braun 
(1998) 
 
 
McIntyre and Salas (1995) 
 
Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, and Payne 
(1998) 
 
 
Mutual Performance monitoring Team members ability to track 
what others on the team are doing 
while carrying out their own 
tasks 
 Team members have an accurate 
understanding of their teammates’ 
workload. 
 
Dickinson and McIntyre (1997) 
 
 
Backup/supportive behaviour The ability to shift and balance 
workload among team members 
during high-workload or high-
pressure periods 
 Team members communicate the need for 
task assistance. 
 Team members promptly offer and accept 
task assistance. 
McIntyre and Salas (1995) 
Adaptability The team’s ability to shift and 
balance strategies to changing 
situations 
 Team members replace or modify routines 
when the task changes. 
 Team members detect changes in their 
environment quickly. 
S. W. Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, and 
Smith (1999) 
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KSAs Description Example Behavioural Markers Example Citations 
 Team members accurately assess the 
causes of important changes. 
Team Leadership Dynamic process of social 
problem solving involving 
information search and 
structuring, information use in 
problem solving, managing 
personnel resources, and 
managing material resources 
 Team members appropriately identify the 
person with the most appropriate skill set 
for leadership in a specific situation. 
 Team members shift leadership roles in 
response to task demands. 
 Leaders develop plans and communicate 
them to the team. 
 
Burke et al. (2006) 
Salas et al. (2008) 
 
 
ATTITUDES    
Mutual trust The shared belief among team 
members that everyone will 
perform their roles and protect 
the interests of fellow team 
members 
 Team members are willing to admit 
mistakes. 
 Team members share a belief that team 
members will perform their tasks and 
roles. 
Driskell and Salas (1992) 
Team/collective efficacy The team members’ sense of 
collective competence and their 
ability to achieve their goals 
 Team members share positive evaluations 
about the team’s capacity to perform its 
tasks and meet its goals 
Bandura (1986) 
Team/collective orientation   Team members have high levels of task 
involvement and participatory goal 
setting. 
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KSAs Description Example Behavioural Markers Example Citations 
 Team members value team goals over 
individual goals. 
 
Psychological safety The team members’ shared belief 
that it is safe to take interpersonal 
risks 
 Team members believe others on the team 
have positive intentions 
Edmondson (1999) 
Source: Adapted from Rosen et al. (2013)
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Shared Mental Model 
Smith-Jentsch et al. (2001) investigated mental models as a possible mediator of task 
performance in individuals. Shared knowledge refers to similar knowledge (i.e. 
homogeneous), or to knowledge that is distributed among team members (i.e. heterogeneous) 
(Cooke et al., 2000). Effective teams may not share knowledge that is similar or common 
among them. Instead, team members might hold compatible or complementary knowledge in 
addition to common knowledge (J. A. Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2014). 
According to Rouse and Morris (1986, p. 351),  “mental models are the mechanisms 
whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations 
of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states.”  
Efforts to develop taxonomies of mental models tend to produce attribute-oriented 
characterisations for particular tasks (Rouse & Morris, 1986).  
According to Salas, Rosen, Burke, Nicholson, and Howse (2007), shared mental 
models consist in knowledge that allows a closed-loop communication, mutual performance 
monitoring, and adaptive and supportive behaviour.  
Team Mental Model 
Recent research has emphasised team processes such as task coordination and 
performance. There has been a shift from individual mental models to team mental models 
(Ford, Kraiger, & Merritt, 2010). Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, and Kraiger (2005) and Mathieu, 
Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (2000) have investigated the pre- and post-
training effects of mental models on team performance and /or team process.  
Marks, Zaccaro, and Mathieu (2000) studied the pre- and post-training effects of 
mental models on team performance, more specifically how team interaction training 
influences team members’ knowledge structures (measured by a modified form of concept 
mapping). They found that team interaction training (cross-training) as well as leader 
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briefings led to enhanced levels of mental model similarity (sharedness) and accuracy. The 
enhanced level of knowledge facilitated communication between team members and 
increased overall team performance.  
A mental model is similar to the one of Situational Awareness (SA). SA theories in 
general make the assumption that mental models enables SA by directing the operator’s 
attention and by providing a means of integrating information and acting as mechanism for 
projection of future system states (Endsley, 2000).  
 Stanton, Salmon, Walker, and Jenkins (2008) suggested that there is a similar 
relationship between genotype (stereotypical) and phenotype (local- and individual-specific) 
schemata, as between mental models and SA. Genotype schemata are triggered by task-
relevant information and operator behaviours, whilst phenotype schemata are constructed and 
updated based on genotype data during task performance (Stanton et al., 2008). 
Method 
Research Design 
The literature search for this review was conducted by using different databases. The 
articles were chosen based on their relevance to CRM training in the maritime, aviation and 
healthcare domains. Keywords used in the search process included “training”, “Crew 
Resource Management”, “Maritime Resource Management”, and “non-technical skills”. 
Search Engines and databases that have been used in the literature search include 
Academic Search Premier (EBSCOhost), Google Scholar, European PubMed Central, Oria, 
ProQuest, PsycARTICLES, PsychINFO, ScienceDirect (Elsevier), Scopus, Springer Link and 
Web of Science.  
Ship accident data has been obtained from IHS Maritime’s World Casualty Statistics - 
2013. Reports on maritime casualties & incidents have been retrieved from the European 
Maritime Safety Agency and the UK’s MAIB. Aviation accident data have been retrieved 
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from IATA, ICAO, and CAA. Railway accident data has been retrieved rom ERA and 
Eurostat. Road accident data have been retrieved from the CARE database. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Research articles in the literature review have been selected on the basis of their 
relevance for the topic, maritime training and assessment. However, there is a paucity of 
research on the effectiveness of training on maritime safety. The literature search is therefore 
based on purposeful sampling.  The articles were selected on the basis of relevance with 
respect to training and assessment and safety performance. Some of the articles are not about 
training and assessment. This is due to two reasons: a) there is a paucity of articles on CRM 
training that measure training effectiveness in the maritime domain b) the chosen articles are 
relevant with regard to maritime safety. 
 Theory on teamwork that has been used to gain an understanding of the subject 
include Holt et al. (2001); S. W. J. Kozlowski and Salas (2010). 
Evaluation of Training Effectiveness 
The evaluation of training effectiveness is based on Level 1 (Reactions), Level 2 
(Learning) and Level 3 (Behaviour) of Kirkpatrick’s four levels of training evaluation. 
 
Table 2 Kirkpatrick’s typology 
Level 1 Reaction 
 
How do the trainees react to the training? Level 2 
(reactions) is the equivalent of measuring customer 
satisfaction. 
Level 2 Learning What have the trainees learned? Did they modify their 
attitudes and belief after training? 
Level 3 Behaviour Has the training resulted in changes in trainees’ behaviour 
(transfer of training)?  
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Level 4 Organisation Tangible evidence from training. How does the training 
impact the organisation’s safety performance?  
Source: Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2006) 
 
The first step in implementing this training evaluation model is to understand the 
guidelines of level 1 and applying them in every programme (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 
2006).  Level 1 is the starting point, and one should proceed to the other levels as time and 
opportunity allow (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). Level 1 refers to the content of the 
training. The training should be comfortable, relevant and interesting. Level 2 (learning 
outcomes) measures what the trainee has learned during training. Has the trainee achieved the 
intended objectives?  Level 3  (transfer of training) is related to training effectiveness, whilst 
Level 4 is related to safety performance at the organisational level.  
Level 3 (transfer of training) represents a challenge. We do not know whether Level 1 
and Level 2 actually transfer to changes in behaviour.  Level 4 (results of training) ought to 
document that the training has produced tangible results, i.e. a reduction in total losses of 
ships. 
Training evaluation is based on whether they have been effective, and whether it is 
quantifiable and measurable in improved team performance or improved safety in the working 
environment. Kirkpatrick’s typology is a useful method to evaluate whether training 
programmes have been successful, i.e. improved team performance. Training effectiveness is 
a construct that can be difficult to assess.  In the literature review I have focused on Level 3 
(transfer of training). Transfer of training is related to safety behaviour. 
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Findings 
 Table 3 Training and Assessment  
Source Content Type of Study/Method Transfer of Training (Level 3) 
 
Results of Training (Level 4) 
Bloor, 
Sampson, and 
Gekara (2013) 
The article reflects on 
the issues of the 
training double bind. 
The training double 
bind refers to the 
contradictory 
influences employers 
exercise on education 
and training 
providers. 
Literature review of the 
computer-based assessments 
 
 Enforced self-regulation has 
been proposed to address the 
situation. 
Brun et al. 
(2001) 
 
Four teams consisting 
of 6 members each 
 
Pilot study/experiment with 22 
male and 2 female cadets 
 
Experimental group and control 
group 
 
Simulator task: Sail from 
“Brekstad Harbour” to 
“Stokkesund” 
 
Medium degree of shared team 
understanding in the equipment 
domain (from 38 to 52 percent 
across the teams) 
 
Shared task understanding: 74,5 
percent agreement on the 
choices on average.  
 
There were no systematic 
differences in degree of shared 
mental understanding in the 
pre- and post-test 
administration of the SMM 
questionnaire regarding which 
tasks to prioritise in a critical 
situation. 
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Measure team 
decision-making 
under stressful 
conditions and 
develop a method 
that could be used to 
measure “shared 
mental models” 
(SMM) 
 
Pre-post design 
 
 
Team interaction model: 
Average scores between the 
teams in the control group 
varied between 83 to 85 
percent (Team 1 and Team 2).  
 
Team model: Only small (and 
not systematic) differences 
between the teams on the 
degree of shared mental models 
across the domains.  
 
Chauvin, 
Clostermann, 
and Hoc 
(2009) 
Analysis of the 
performance of 
trainee watch officers 
with regard to 
decision-making in 
collision avoidance 
situations 
Multiple correspondence 
analysis 
Experimental group and control 
group (both groups were made 
up of 81 students) 
 
Students who have experience 
of navigating on board car 
ferries perceive correctly the 
vessel’s relative speed, 
anticipating that the give-way 
merchant vessel will keep her 
course 
 
Only 1 of the 13 subjects who 
have experience of navigating 
on board ferries performed a 
late manoeuver to port 
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Chauvin & al. 
(2013) 
Analysis of 27 recent 
collisions  
 
Multifactorial analysis of 
collisions at sea using HFAC-
Coll 
 
Skill-based errors are absent 
and violations are exceptional.  
Unsafe acts are mainly related 
to decision-making (85%). 
 
Devitt and 
Holford (2010) 
20 interviewees  
 
Selection based on 
purposeful sampling 
 
Qualitative interviews 
 
Assessment of criteria for 
leadership and its associated 
behavioral markers 
 
 
Effective leadership, an open 
working culture, and strong 
teamwork can make the 
difference between a crew 
performing safely and 
efficiently, and one that fails to 
achieve the potential of the 
team members on board 
Goeters (2002) Evaluation of training 
needs 
 
Experiment  
 
Pre-post design 
 
 A training need for decision-
making can be observed.  
 
After the post-test a massive 
improvement in non-technical 
skills in situational awareness 
and decision-making can be 
observed.  
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Fonne et al. 
(1995) 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Pre-post design 
 The results of this study show a 
positive change in attitudes and 
increased individual awareness 
and knowledge of team 
processes. 
The follow-up study 6 months 
after the training showed that 
the attitude change was not as 
pronounced as directly after 
the training 
 
Hetherington, 
Flin, and 
Mearns (2006) 
 
Literature review of 20 articles 
on maritime safety 
 
Human factors issues prevalent 
in the maritime industry, such 
as CRM, BRM and ERM, are 
subject to a number of 
methodological problems or 
“gaps”. 
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 Bloor et al. (2013) explores some of the challenges faced by those attempting to 
standardise maritime education and training across globalised markets. Bloor et al. (2013) 
examines how specialist crewing agencies operating in new labour supply countries have 
problematised the assessment of seafarer training and how effectively international regulations 
on training standards are enforced.  
The training double bind refers to the contradictory influences employers exercise on 
education and training providers, on the one hand demanding the urgent provision of more 
recruits, and on the other complaining about the poor quality of recruits received (Bloor et al., 
2013, p. 1). The shipping industry is one of the industries that has been the most transformed 
by globalising economic processes (Sampson, 2013). There is now a single global market for 
seafarers, the majority of whom come from the transitional states of Eastern Europe and from 
developing countries. Nine nations supply two-thirds of the million seafarers in the international 
fleet: the Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, China, India, Poland, Indonesia, Turkey, and Myanmar) 
(Sampson & Wu, 2004).  
Seafarers are frequently employed by specialist international crewing agencies. Ship 
operators have transferred the costs of training their outsourced labor to seafarers themselves 
and seafarers’ families in the developing world (Bloor et al., 2013, p. 2). There are (were) 
concerns that maritime education and training institutions do not meet the training standards of 
STCW. Those concerns led the IMO to set up the “white list” system in 2003 (Bloor et al., 
2013, p. 2). There is little evidence that the overall quality of new training improved following 
the introduction of the white list.  
Governance of globalisation is highly problematic. Shipping is a prime example of the 
problems of governance in globalised industries (the nation states translate regulations by IMO 
into their national shipping regulations; and all vessels must be registered with a ship registry 
that complies with these national shipping regulations, which are enforced through a 
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jurisdiction called “Flag State Control” (Bloor et al., 2013). Today there is even a Mongolian 
registry, despite the fact that Mongolia lies 850 miles from the sea (Bloor et al., 2013, p. 4). 
The shipping industry has a “polycentric” governance structure, meaning that it is fragmentary, 
complex, multi-level, and overlapping in character (Black, 2008).  
Enforced self-regulation, such as deletion from the white list of states that do not comply 
with seafarer training standards, has been proposed to address the situation. However, deletion 
from the white list is only practicable for small nations that are small-scale suppliers of maritime 
labour (Bloor et al., 2013, p. 4).  
 Chauvin et al. (2009) presents an analysis the performance of trainee watch officers 
with regard to decision-making in collision avoidance situations. Collision avoidance 
manoeuvres are frequent in the Dover Straits. In some of these situations observed behavior is 
in violation with existing rules and regulations. These violations occur in situations when the 
COLREGS (COLision avoidance REG-ulations) recommend that the give way vessel should 
alter her course to starboard so as to cross astern of the stand-on vessel (Chauvin et al., 2009). 
Informal rules can also exist side by side with formal regulations and shape the actors’ 
behaviour.  
In situations where different goals or rules are contradictory, experts are able to make 
a compromise between three types of requirements (Chauvin et al., 2009) : The (control) 
requirements of the task, the requirements of regulations, and the requirements of 
performance. 
Flin (2006) defines the notion of resilience as the ability to manage conflicts between 
production and safety goals.  Experts are better than novices to assess their own strengths and 
weaknesses. Experts are also able tot take in more information than beginners, and call upon 
patterns, which enable them to develop precise mental models of the situation and make an 
appropriate decision (Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997). 
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 In an analysis of car officers’ activity on board car ferries (Hockey, Healey, 
Crawshaw, Wastell, & Sauer, 2003), the watch officer onboard the stand-on vessel has to 
anticipate the ‘give-way’ vessel’s actions and carefully monitor the situation. Rule 17 
(COLREGS) generates a lot of workload upon the officer. However, officers manage to 
follow the rules and control the situation. If the give-way vessel will not take action, officers 
change course very early, before rules begin to apply (Chauvin et al., 2009). 
 Two groups of fifth-year students took part in the experiment (both groups were made 
up of 81 students). The students were presented with two decision-making exercises in 
collision avoidance manoeuvres in the in the Dover Straits traffic separation scheme. 
The experiment was carried out in a bridge simulator. The simulator reproduces the bridge 
layout of a modern vessel. 
The aim of the experiment was the following (Chauvin et al., 2009, p. 1126): 
(a) Compare the results obtained by students who went through the training programme 
and by students who did not.  
(b) Assess the effect of the type of navigation experienced during on-the-job training on 
the cognitive process and performance of trainees 
The method that was chosen was multiple correspondence analysis. The experimental 
situation reproduced a typical situation observed in the Dover Straits.  The experiment lasted 
43 minutes. After a ten-minute presentation of the experiment, followed by a five-minute 
period to become familiar with the situation under scrutiny, the simulation began. 
Two hypotheses were formed with regard to this experiment (Chauvin et al., 2009, p. 
1227): 
(a) The decision-training programme will lead to a greater improvement in the experimental 
group’s performance than the control group 
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(b) Students who already have already performed on-the-job-training, will adopt an expert 
strategy aimed at controlling the situation 
The article mentions that only 1 of the 13 subjects who have experience of navigating 
on board ferries performed a late manoeuver to port (7%, as opposed to 28% for the other 
subjects). Students who have experience of navigating on board car ferries perceive correctly 
the vessel’s relative speed, anticipating that the give-way merchant vessel will keep her 
course (Chauvin et al., 2009). There is a tendency in the results for the experimental group 
that they pay greater attention to the situation’s features than students in the control group.  A 
possible of outcome of the study is that the decision-making games can be used to familiarise 
trainees with specific situations 
 Chauvin et al. (2013) conducted a systemic and multifactorial analysis of collisions at 
sea using HFAC-Coll. The study is an analysis of 27 recent collisions using HFACS-Coll, and 
is based on investigation reports from MAIB and TSB. The analysis relies on a tool based on 
Reason’s model, the Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The HFACS 
describes human error at each of four levels of failure: 
(a) Unsafe acts of operators 
(b) Preconditions for unsafe acts 
(c) Unsafe supervision 
(d) Organisational influences  
Chauvin et al. (2013) found that skill-based errors were absent and violations  
are exceptional. Unsafe acts are mainly related to decision-making (85%). The study confirms 
the importance of BRM for navigation and stresses the need to investigate the masters’ 
decisions with regard to bridge manning and vessel speed. Bridge resource mismanagement 
includes problems of coordination and problems of communication between crewmembers. 
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BRM failures can be linked to poor shared mental models and shared situational awareness in 
the bridge team. 
 Fonne et al. (1995) conducted a training evaluation of attitude change among 
Norwegian HSV-navigators. The aim of the evaluation was to assess the useful of CRM and its 
potential for increasing safety and anticipating change of behaviour (Fonne et al., 1995). The 
course concept was based on two models. The SHELL model emphasises the human-machine 
interphases. The COORDINATION model emphasises the Liveware-Liveware interphases 
(communication, workload, social atmosphere, and culture). 
The method was a questionnaire modified for use by maritime navigators.  The 
questionnaire was completed on three different occasions (Fonne et al., 1995, p. 587): 
(a) Before attending the seminar 
(b) Directly following completion of the seminar 
(c) As a follow-up study 6 months after completing the seminar 
The study shows that there is an attitude change in the captains’ preference regarding 
subservient or self-assured first officers. Ratings after the seminar show that only 41% of the 
captains prefer the self-assured type, compared to 54% in the pre-seminar. Fonne et al. (1995) 
observed a significant change in the respondents’ attitude to the statement “Navigators should 
feel obliged to inform the rest of the crew about one’s own psychological stress, before and 
during the assignment (Fonne et al., 1995, p. 588)”. Before the seminar 39% of the respondents 
prefer keeping personal stress as private matter. After the seminar the response was significantly 
reduced to 25%. With regard to the statement “I have reduced visibility. I reduce the vessel’s 
speed with Y%”, 29% of the participants answered that they hardly reduce speed in conditions 
of low visibility (Fonne et al., 1995). The follow-up study 6 months after the training showed 
that the attitude change was not as pronounced as directly after the training. 
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 Goeters (2002) conducted a training evaluation of 17 pilots in an A320 simulator. Step 
1 (pre-phase) consisted of a Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario to be flown in an 
A320 simulator equipped with dual channel audio and night vision video recording. Step 2 
(training phase) covered the standard training goals with respect to communication, 
cooperation, leadership/management and situational awareness (Goeters, 2002). Step 3 (post-
phase), consisted of a LOFT mission that intended to evaluate the effects of CRM training. 
Step 3 could only be undertaken after some time had elapsed since the training. The NOTECHS 
systems was used to assess the training. 
The results show that for there is a training need for decision-making. Both captains and 
first officers score low on decision-making. The distribution of scores for participating pilots 
displayed a large spread in their performance level of non-technical skills (Goeters, 2002). With 
the pre-post design it is possible to identify the influence of certain treatments on performance 
and behaviour. The treatment in this study is the customised CRM training with a stabilisation 
duty time of three months (Goeters, 2002). After the post-test a massive improvement in non-
technical skills was observed both at the elementary level and the categorical level in situational 
awareness and decision making. 
 Hetherington et al. (2006) did a literature review of 20 studies on human factors in the 
maritime industry. The article mentions the relationship between safety climate and safety 
performance. The article presented many human factors elements that can be contributory to 
accidents, such as fatigue, automation, teamwork, and health. The article makes an assessment 
of the current status of attempts to face address these human factors issues, such as CRM, BRM 
and ERM. (Hetherington et al., 2006) mentions that the methodological problems within the 
shipping literature seems to be consistent and are based around five themes (Hetherington et 
al., 2006, p. 410): 
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(a) There are questions about the ecological validity of earlier conducted research 
(Hockey et al., 2003) 
(b)  Sample sizes are small (Ek, 2003; Koester, 2003)  
(c) A large proportion of the work in the maritime domain is retrospective 
(d) Issues of validity with research administered to individuals in their second 
language 
(e) Lack of performance measures that can assess human behaviours or conditions 
(e.g. fatigue) 
Technological advances have contributed to decreased manning on board merchant 
vessels. VLCCs typically have crews of 22 seafarers (Hetherington et al., 2006, p. 402). This 
development is due to two factors: technological advances in navigation aids and ship design 
has reduced the frequency and severity of shipping accidents; the reduction of technological 
failures have revealed the influence of human error in accident causation (Hetherington et al., 
2006). The incidents of the last 20 years represent 83 per cent of the total. Human factors was 
cited as the cause in 16 percent of all port accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006).  
Hetherington et al. (2006) mentions that CRM training may reduce human factors 
related causes of incidents and in turn incidents themselves. Hetherington et al. (2006) 
concludes that the human factors issues prevalent in the maritime industry, such as CRM, BRM 
and ERM, are subject to a number of methodological problems or “gaps”: 
 Brun et al. (2001) conducted a pilot study/experiment with a community of 22 male 
and 2 female cadets. The research design was a survey/questionnaire. The study is based on 
Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993). The community consisted of four 
teams consisting of 6 members each. These were divided into two groups, one experimental 
group and one control group. 
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The research design was a pilot study/experiment with 22 male and 2 female cadets. 
The method chosen for the research design is a quantitative survey/questionnaire. The aim of 
the study was to measure team decision-making under stressful conditions and develop a 
method that could be used to measure “shared mental models” (SMM). There were four types 
of mental models: equipment model, task model, team interaction model, team model 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). There was a medium degree of shared team understanding in 
the equipment domain (from 38 to 52 percent across the teams). Shared task understanding: 
On average there was a 74,5 percent agreement on the choices. The most popular task to 
choose was to turn on the lights (nine subjects ticked this option). There were no systematic 
differences in degree of shared mental understanding in the pre- and post-test administration 
of the SMM questionnaire regarding which tasks to prioritise in a critical situation. 
Team interaction model: Average scores between the teams in the control group varied 
between 83 to 85 percent (team 1 and Team 2). There was a very high degree of agreement 
among the team members on what was considered relevant information sources. 
Team model: There were only small (and not systematic) differences between the teams on 
the degree of shared mental models across the domains. Hence, they cannot conclude that one 
of their teams is systematically “better”. 
  Devitt and Holford (2010) identified whether the broad competence criteria described 
in the STCW amendments would be consistently interpreted by maritime stakeholders. The 
interviewees include P&I Clubs, ship owners, and ship managers based in the UK. The aim of 
the study was to develop a behavioural marker system specific to the maritime industry that 
would enable resource management and leadership competencies to be evaluated against the 
framework of STCW (Devitt & Holford, 2010) . 
The impact of positive and negative behaviours around teamwork was clearly 
identified. Some respondents made a link between effective leadership behavior and effective 
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team performance (Devitt & Holford, 2010, p. 11). Both positive and negative behaviours 
were identified for situation and risk assessment aspects of decision-making (Devitt & 
Holford, 2010, p. 13). Questions were raised whether some team members’ competence 
reflected formal qualifications (Devitt & Holford, 2010, p. 17). Other key factors were 
communication of the task and the ability of the team to clarify tasks and identify potential 
risk issues. 
Effective leadership, an open working culture, and strong teamwork can make the 
difference between a crew performing safely and efficiently, and one that fails to achieve the 
potential of the team members on board (Devitt & Holford, 2010, p. 22). Behavioral markers 
pertaining to evaluation criteria in STCW are less tangible to identify. The next stage of the 
research will be to propose behavioral markers that can be validated in a simulated 
environment. 
Analysis 
Training and assessment in the maritime sector differs from that in high-reliability 
organisations for a number of reasons. One of them is that the maritime industry is atypical 
from companies in high-reliability industries such as aviation and railway. The shipping 
industry is increasingly organised along global value chains, and ship owners have transferred 
the costs of training and assessment of their outsourced labour to seafarers themselves and 
seafarers’ families in the developing world (Bloor et al., 2013, p. 2).  
In the maritime industry, the charter party (i.e. the contract) confers considerable 
authority on the cargo owner, thereby reducing the cargo owner’s liability in terms of safety 
(Molland, 2008, p. 787). Shipping companies worldwide need only comply with the 
mandatory minimum requirements of the STCW Code (IMO, 2011).  
Training and assessment of maritime personnel may reduce the probability of human 
error, and thus reduce the risks of an accident. The most common accidents attributed to 
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human error on board ships are collisions. Common accidents that occur during the 
navigational watch are running aground in inshore waterways or even during maritime 
operations in a port. In addition to the navigational watch, maritime personnel should also 
have adequate training in other areas that are vital to the safety on board a ship, such as proper 
maintenance of the hull & machinery, training in how to use fire extinguishing equipment, 
cargo safety procedures, and safety procedures when loading/unloading cargo 
CRM Training 
CRM training was introduced as a means to improve teamwork coordination and 
cooperation in the cockpit. It has since then been introduced in many high-reliability 
industries as a means to improve team effectiveness and reduce the occurrence of human 
error. According to Reason´s /(1997) “Swiss cheese” of accident causation, humans are prone 
to make human error.  
CRM can help improve team cohesion on the bridge. In a complex technical 
environment as a bridge, team coordination and cooperation is important. This is particularly 
the case for large cruise ships. Cruise ships are complex socio-technical systems that depend 
on the service of functional teams. Creating a safety culture in which each team member is 
knowledgeable of her role and how to react to abnormal situations is an important 
precondition for improving safety. In this respect, CRM can be used as a means to increase 
SA and decision-making skills. Decision-making skills are very important in collision 
avoidance situations (Chauvin et al., 2009). CRM can also be used to create a community of 
practice. But this may not be achievable on ships that have a high degree of turnover. 
Teamwork is an important component in the day-to-day operations of a ship. 
Teamwork is especially important during nautical tasks like navigating, manoeuvring, and 
berthing. Resource Management training now make extensive use of simulators as a means to 
improve team performance. The task performance of the individual seafarer depends on 
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his/her ability to act as a member of a team. The master, the first mate, the second mate, and 
other members of the Crew are all part of a team that need to solve problems in the day-to-day 
activities of a ship. The OOW depends on accurate information from fellow team members 
and from the Integrated Bridge system. BRM may help improve communication between the 
OOW and other team members. 
Training in non-technical skills may also increase the trainees’ situational awareness. 
SA is especially important in navigation. Maintaining a proper lookout on the bridge, and 
being able to take correct decisions at the right moment, as well as anticipating future events, 
can be important for handling unanticipated situations (e.g. collision avoidance).  
Regularly seafarers are exposed to environmental and physical factors at sea that 
require an effective response. Navigation requires both technical skills and non-technical 
skills such as situational awareness and decision-making. The officer in charge of the 
navigational watch will often experience situations at sea requiring immediate attention and 
action. Bridge Resource Management has changed how captains work on board ships. Now 
the captain is more of a resource and manages the bridge team to which he assigns roles. A 
key to success is “thinking aloud” (Marine Casualties Investigative Body, 2013) 
Lack of situational awareness has been mentioned as a cause of maritime accidents 
(Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991). Officers should have compatible and complementary 
knowledge when they are performing their tasks (J. A. Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2014).  
Training that aims at developing non-technical skills such as CRM may increase the 
trainees’ ability to cope with abnormal situations. On the flight deck, CRM training has been 
used to train the non-technical skills of aircrews in civil aviation since 1979. Numerous 
studies have attempted to evaluate the effect of training on team performance (Salas, Burke, et 
al., 2001; Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman, 2006). Training in team coordination and 
cooperation may have an effect on how individuals perform in a team (S. W. J. Kozlowski, 
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Grand, Baard, & Pearce, 2015). Training in non-technical skills such as decision-making, 
leadership and situational awareness can facilitate teamwork and reduce the occurrence of 
human error. 
Effective teams may not share similar knowledge, but compatible knowledge 
(heterogeneous knowledge) (Marks et al., 2000). Shared mental model and situational 
awareness are comparable elements, and some researchers have depicted them as representing 
the same things (Stanton et al., 2008). Team training such as CRM training can improve 
shared mental model similarity (and accuracy) (Marks et al., 2000).  
Training of non-technical skills such as situational awareness can facilitate the 
development of a shared mental model on the bridge, and thereby facilitate teamwork. The 
aim is to develop a common understanding/knowledge and increase team efficiency.   
Training effectiveness will depend on a number of constructs, such as time spent on 
training, personal motivation, cognitive ability, and competencies (KSAs). The effectiveness 
of a training programme depends to a large degree on the transfer of competencies (KSAs) to 
the trainee.   
There are many other variables that can impact safety than just the training of non-technical 
skills. In the past decades we have seen a development where the maritime industry has 
improved its safety performance. However, it seems that maritime regulations and automation 
has had a more direct effect on safety performance than training. Amendments in SOLAS 74 
and the STCW Code have a direct impact on safety. Port State Control (Paris MoU and Tokyo 
MoU) and ship detentions also have a positive impact on safety performance. 
Automation has been introduced on board ships as a barrier to human error. The 
master needs to be aware of both technological and human factors elements, and overreliance 
on navigational instruments such as ECDIS can contribute to accidents.  
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There has been a substantial improvement in safety performance in aviation, rail, road, 
and maritime. The maritime industry has a higher variability in fatality rates than the other 
transport systems.  
IMO 
International Conventions such as IMO play an important role in ensuring safety at 
sea. STCW 1978/95/2010 and the introduction of mandatory certificates of competencies for 
seafarers have greatly improved safety.  The problem with IMO with regard to training and 
assessment is that the organisation does not have any enforcement capacity. It is up to the 
national authorities, the flag state, to implement the STCW Code. IMO consists of 171 
different member states, and the implementation of the STCW Code may vary between these. 
IMO strives to make the maritime certifications of competency transparent. However, 
globalisation of the seafaring working force and the fact that many shipowners register their 
ship(s) in foreign ship registers such as Panama, Liberia, or the Marshall Islands, does not 
contribute to maritime safety.  
Maritime transport compared to other transport modes  
The fatality rates in transport modes such as aviation and railroad have decreased 
significantly since the 1990s. There has been a continual improvement in safety performance 
and the occurrence of human error in these industries is very rare. The fatality rate for aviation 
is now 22.0 per million flights flown (CAA, 2013). Road is the leading cause of death in the 
age group 25 to 44 (Cooper, Burke, & Clarke, 2011).The most vulnerable transport modes are 
Powered Two-Wheelers (P2W), cyclists, and pedestrians. Maritime transport is the fourth 
safest transport mode, after aviation, rail, and bus.  
Maritime Safety  
Maritime safety has improved continuously in the last four decades (DNV, 2013). 
However, attitudes regarding safety vary a lot depending on what part of the world one is 
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operating. In shipping the competition can also be very intense, and some ship owners may 
think that they can get away with spending less on training. 
The safety culture in the maritime industry may vary widely geographically, 
depending on the rules and regulations that are customary in some parts of the world. National 
cultures vary with respect to power distance and the degree of human inequality, uncertainty 
avoidance and how they adapt to unstructured situations. Values, risk perception and safety 
standards are known to differ between nationalities (Hofstede, 2001).  
Most training and assessment programmes in the maritime domain are linked to 
regulations that have been adopted by IMO member states and implemented into national 
legislation. However, given the global dimension of shipping, the organisational structure of a 
maritime organisation may vary a lot. There is not a single shipping company that has the 
same organisational structure with respect to manning and how to promote a safety culture on 
board.  
Simulation-Based Training 
The maritime industry has invested billions of dollars in advanced simulators that can 
mimic the conditions that are present in a rough and hazardous sea environment. Since it was 
first introduced in the 1980s, Simulation-Based Training has been used as a training method 
for maritime trainees. SBT can only be considered to be effective if the learning in the 
simulator transfers to a real-world setting. As a simulator is a tool in the learning process, 
there are requirements to assess the training effectiveness of SBT (Cross, 2011). In order to 
assess the performance of a trainee, one has to compare the trainee’s performance against a 
criterion or a standard. Methods of evaluation and measurement have been developed to 
assess the trainee’s training outcome. The elements required for evaluating SBT are the 
following (Reay, 1994): 
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 Methodology (how to evaluate and with which tools) 
 Criteria (which outcome is required) 
 Objectivity (outcome not influenced) 
 Reliability (measurement consistency) 
 Validity (measures what is intended) 
 Fidelity (accuracy in reproduction of simulated process) 
 Reality (impression has physical and behavioural realism) 
 
 
The bridge of a ship can be compared to a command and control centre. The maritime 
industry differs from aviation in that it is a highly hierarchical system. The bridge system 
depends on the interaction of the master, the first mate, the second mate, and the officer of the 
watch. A bridge team can consist of up to 10 members (Øvergård, Sorensen, Martinsen, & 
Nazir, 2014). 
Safety performance  
Safety performance has become a very important issue for organisations in various 
domains, including the maritime industry.  In the maritime industry, there is a lack of 
knowledge on the effect of training and assessment on safety performance at the sharp end. 
However, there is some research on the effect of training and assessment on human 
performance from other industries. In the literature review I will give an overview of some 
results that have been achieved by other industries with respect to the effect of training and 
assessment on safety performance at the sharp end. 
Most research on the effect of training and assessment on safety performance have 
been conducted in the aviation industry, which pioneered research in the area of Crew 
Resource Management. Aviation has also been one of the most successful industries in terms 
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of safety performance. The number of accidents in the aviation industry was relatively stable 
from 2009 to 2012, resulting in an accident rate of approximately 4 accidents per million 
departures (ICAO, 2014, p. 27). However, the number of accidents dropped to 3.2 accidents 
per million departures in 2012. There has also been a sharp decrease in the number of 
fatalities from 2009 to 2013.  
  Industries such as health-care (anaesthesia), road, rail, nuclear power plants, and 
maritime have adapted CRM to their own communities of practice. The aviation industry was 
the first to implement Crew Resource Management as a training and assessment method. 
The military domain has extensive experience with training and assessment. Concepts 
such as distributed or shared situational awareness were first used in a military setting.  
Maritime organisations now have to comply with the new regulations on training and 
assessment mentioned in the amendments. Bridge Resource Management, or Bridge Team 
Management, is a training and assessment method that aims at developing Crew members’ 
non-technical skills. 
The challenge here is how we measure safety performance. Safety performance in 
high reliability industries such as aviation, health care and rail is measured by looking at 
passenger safety. Passenger safety can be measured by calculating the number of fatalities per 
billion km. Safety Performance in road is measured by calculating the number of fatalities per 
billion vehicle km.  
The maritime industry has used the term total loss to describe maritime casualties 
(very serious casualties). The total loss rate can be calculated by dividing the total loss 
number with the number of world trading fleet. Another indicator for measuring safety 
performance is the total incident number per 1,000 shipyears (a shipyear is defined as one 
ship operating for one year).  
Team Mental Models is a part of the mandatory training and assessment of seafarers. 
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Some higher end segments of the shipping industry, such as Mærsk, have implemented 
simulator-based training as a measure to improve team effectiveness across their maritime 
operations. For example, Mærsk uses simulator-based training to create scenarios with high 
level of realism to increase competencies and job performance. The aim of the CRM training 
at Maersk is to enhance team performance through the training of no-technical skills such as 
decision-making, communication. The purpose of CRM training at Mærsk is to establish a no-
excuse performance culture based on a high level of personal responsibility, strong 
operational teams, and clear cross-departmental communication (Mærsk Training, 2013). 
Teamwork 
Effective teamwork may have an impact on safety performance at the sharp end. 
Teams are generally more adept at finding solutions to problems than individuals who 
perform on their own. Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005) point out that it is important to make a 
distinction between team performance and team effectiveness. Team performance refers to the 
outcome of the team’s actions regardless of how the team may have completed the task. Team 
effectiveness takes also into consideration how the team interacted (i.e. team processes, 
teamwork) to achieve the team outcome (Salas et al., 2005, p. 557). 
Efficient teams are made up of team members who are aware of team functioning and 
manage to monitor and catch the mistakes, slips and lapses of fellow team members before or 
shortly after they have occurred (Salas et al., 2005). 
Bridge Resource Management 
Bridge Resource Management policy and procedures include situational awareness, 
communication skills, managing stress, management of workload, etc. Bridge Resource 
Management now also includes mandatory training of non-technical skills such as maritime 
resource management and security awareness. The maritime industry has also invested 
billions of dollars in advanced simulators that can realistically mimic reality (Virtual Reality). 
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Navigation now requires competence in mastering advanced navigational instruments 
such as Advanced Radar Plotting Aid, Electronic Chart Display & Information System, and 
Automatic Identification System. It has become increasingly important for the OOW to master 
non-technical skills such as situational awareness, decision-making, and communication in 
addition to technical skills in navigation or in maritime engineering. 
Following the lead of the aviation industry, Crew Resource Management training is 
now implemented in many industries, including the maritime industry, e.g. MaÆrsk. 
Breakdown of CRM was a causal factor in 60% of Navy and Marine Corps accidents between 
1991 and 2000 (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman, 2006, p. 393). 
Teamwork on the bridge also requires the Officer of the Deck to maintain a proper 
lookout. Management of workload, stress & fatigue are factors that may impact the safety 
performance of the OOW. This comes in addition to the technical skills that are needed for 
navigation.  
On the bridge safety performance will depend on cooperation and interaction between 
team members and on the inter-personal skills of the Crew. Maritime training should focus on 
improving inter-personal skills (leadership, communication, and teamwork) and cognitive 
skills (decision-making and situational awareness) (Flin et al., 2008). 
Technical proficiency and non-technical Team coordination can be important for 
effective decision-making.  In the maritime industry, situational awareness is the single most 
important cause of accidents. The majority of accidents at sea are a result of human error, 
where the Officer of the Watch either fails to understand warning signals from the 
environment, or a result of poor communication and decision-making.  
Does training and assessment affect safety at the sharp end? 
Training effectiveness will depend on a number of constructs, such as time spent on 
training, personal motivation, cognitive ability, and competencies (KSAs). The effectiveness 
56 
 
  
of a training programme depends to a large degree on the transfer of competencies (KSAs) to 
the trainee.   
So has the investment in training and assessment had a noticeable effect on safety 
performance? Some higher end segments of the shipping industry already use CRM as a 
training method throughout their operations. Resource Management has been used with 
satisfactory results in shipping companies such as Maersk. However, the maritime industry 
does not, to my knowledge, have a safety culture that is comparable to that of high-reliability 
industries such as aviation and rail. Since the introduction of CRM training in the aviation 
industry, there has been a continuous improvement in safety performance at the sharp end. 
This has not been the case with the maritime industry. Although the maritime industry has 
improved its safety performance significantly since the 1980s, the relative safety performance 
of the maritime industry has lagged somewhat behind that of other transport modes (see table 
3).  
Road transport has also made significant progress with regard to safety performance, 
at least in Western Europe. Road remains, however, one of the most hazardous transport 
modes, with a fatality rate of 18 per 100 000 people globally (WHO, 2013).  
Accident reporting has only recently become mandatory in the maritime industry. 
Accident reporting (the reporting of slips and lapses) is important in order to take preventive 
action. This has been somewhat lacking in the maritime industry. There is no reason why the 
maritime industry shouldn’t learn from the other industries with regard to incident reporting. 
The introduction of a mandatory safety management system on board ships has to some 
degree improved safety performance, but this cannot be attributed to training.  
However, a maritime organisation can implement measures that aim at reducing the 
probability of human error during complex maritime operations, such as navigating through 
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the Strait of Malacca or manoeuvring a large container ship out of port in congested 
waterways. 
Maritime Accidents 
The MV Sewol tragedy in South Korea in 2014 is an example of substandard shipping. 
Over 200 lives went lost in this disaster, and the cause of the accident may be attributed to 
human error. The underlying cause of the accident was in this case the management of the 
ship at the blunt end, and not so much at the sharp end. But when the accident happened, the 
captain and his crew were not prepared for the situation and gave the wrong order. Telling the 
passenger to stay in their cabins. In this example we see that decision-making skills are 
paramount for keeping safety at sea. In the event of an accident the most important task is to 
get the passengers out of harm’s way. To achieve this one has to give the correct information 
at the right time and have the right procedures. Such accidents highlight the need for training 
non-technical skills.  
Loss of structural hull integrity and liquefaction are often mentioned as the causes of 
total losses in the dry bulk carrier segment (Committee II.1, 1997; Gard AS, 2014). 
Human-machine interaction is an important aspect of safety performance in complex 
systems. Safety performance on the bridge of a ship depends on coordination and a shared 
mental model. To ensure operational safety on board a complex socio-technical system as a 
ship, there are many things that are important. Team coordination, leadership and decision-
making are some of the most important skills that need to training.  
In the maritime industry, there are procedures that should be followed rigorously. One 
of these is when the ship is entering shallow waters and needs the assistance of a pilot. Many 
accidents at the sharp end in shipping happen in coastal waters or in the vicinity of a port. The 
World Fleet Statistics (IHS Maritime, 2014) show that the number of accidents are more 
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frequent in waterways with heavy traffic. Most accidents happen (IUMI, 2015) in the South 
China, Indo China, Indonesia & Philippines, and Japan, Korea and North China. 
Lack of communication between team members on board the ship and/or with the 
Vessel Traffic Services has also been contributory to maritime accidents. However, the 
literature mentions loss of situational awareness as the most frequent cause of accidents. 
Recently in 2014 the Norman Atlantic ferry fire in the Mediterranean showed that 
safety on board in a fire situation requires prompt teamwork and cooperation between 
members of the Crew. It shows that it is important to have people trained in non-technical 
skills such as situational awareness. When a fire breaks out, it is necessary to react as fast as 
possible and keep calm.  
Resource management, which means using all available resources, means making use 
of both non-technical and technical skills in an emergency situation. Training of non-technical 
skills may prepare the seafarer for situations such as a fire or a man over board situation, but 
it is important to practice the non-technical skills as memory usually is short.  
Many accidents that have occurred at sea would have occurred anyway. What the 
seafarer can do is to prepare for situations that will demand a firm reaction.  
The question of automation and its impact on safety is also important. From aviation 
we know that accidents happen in situations where the pilot or the co-pilot does not follow the 
correct procedures. In the maritime world the procedures are different. The safety culture is 
also very different from aviation. Training of non-technical skills may have had an impact on 
safety in the aviation industry. We see that the safety performance in the aviation industry 
also varies a lot across th world, with Africa coming last with regard to safety (see table 2). 
From the literature review, we also see that decision-making and situational awareness 
are some of the most important technical skills with respect to safety in a maritime 
environment. Modern socio-technical systems such as a ship use automation to a large degree. 
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The more advanced the systems on board a ship, the more important it is to train non-
technical skills of seafarers. We cannot say for sure that CRM training has an effect on safety 
performance, but if we look at the improvements in overall year on year safety in different 
transport modes we have to ask ourselves what is the reason behind such an improvement in 
safety performance: We can then go into what we think is most likely. The most likely reason 
for the improvement of safety performance in socio-technical systems is automation. In an 
aircraft, the use of the autopilot has changed both in-flight and landing procedures. In terms of 
safety we see that shipping has been highly successful. The numbers witness that there are 
some regions in the world where there are more casualties than others, for example in the dry 
cargo ship/break bulk segment. If we look at statistics over how many total loses there are 
every year, we see that there is a huge variability in the number of total losses in shipping. 
This distinguishes the shipping industry from other transport modes. This can also be due to 
the unpredictability of shipping. In the container ship segment the ships are getting ever 
larger, now with container ships that have as size of over 19,000 TEU. Shipping is one of the 
most important transport modes with regard to the volume of trade. Training and assessment 
of maritime personnel is very important to ascertain that no life goes lost. But we should be 
aware that human error is the main cause of accidents. Training of non-technical skills such as 
CRM is perhaps the way to go in order to reduce the likelihood of human error. 
Conclusion 
Does CRM training work? There is certainly some ambiguity with regard to the 
effectiveness of CRM training on safety performance in the maritime industry.    
Safety at sea depends on Performance of all individual team members. The safety 
performance of a ship and of its master and crew are inter-linked and are part of a complex 
system. When a complex system involves both technology and humans, it can best be 
described as a socio-technical system (Reason, 1990) 
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Maritime organisations need to comply with regulations set out by the International 
Maritime Organisation with regard to training and assessment of seafarers.  
Training and assessment may have a very high impact on safety performance in a 
maritime organisation. The introduction of new technology and automation are developments 
that may affect safety performance on board ships. 
Billions of dollars have been invested in the development of advanced simulators that 
can realistically mimic real-world scenarios that take place on board ships. Training and 
assessment of seafarers have become ever more important to mitigate the risk of human error. 
Maritime training of non-technical skills may help reduce the risk of human error. 
Trained maritime personnel are more prepared to react in case of an emergency situation. 
Human Factors Skilled-Based Training Programmes in the Maritime Industry 
However, some shipping companies, such as A.P. Møller - Mærsk A/S, have implemented 
Crew Resource Management as part of their compulsory training.  
Training and assessment of management should focus on better communication 
between the master and his crew. Some sectors in the maritime industry, such as  
container shipping, and larger and more complex ships, have changed how shipping 
companies operate.  
The shipping industry now consists of many specialised sectors, with some large 
companies that operate on a global scale in different market segments, such as A.P. Møller - 
Mærsk A/S. Many different actors in an industry operating in a number of different shipping 
markets, is a challenge when it comes to implementing safety measures. Large container ships 
usually have a small crew, but each individual crew member must satisfy formal requirements 
with respect to maritime education and training. This also applies to training with regard to 
improving safety performance.  
The leading industry in terms of safety performance over time is aviation. 
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Although CRM training is now in use in many industries, it has been necessary to adapt the 
contents of CRM to the specific job environment of the industry.  
Training and practicing for safety is very important in order to maintain a proper 
safety culture on board. Preventive measures to improve safety, such as changes in the STCW 
Code, are often introduced after major maritime catastrophes.  
The Costa Concordia incident highlights the need for training and coordination of 
teamwork in complex sociotechnical environments. Navigation is a technical skill that may 
require training in non-technical skills such as situational awareness, management of 
workload, and control of fatigue and stress. A maritime organisation can implement measures 
that aim at reducing the probability of human error during complex maritime operations, such 
as navigating through the Strait of Malacca or manoeuvring a large container ship out of port 
in congested waterways. Since 1912, when the Titanic sank in the Northern Atlantic after 
hitting an iceberg, the maritime industry has vastly improved its safety performance (IUMI, 
2015). Risk is inherent to shipping, and there are great geographical variations with respect to 
safety culture.  
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